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There are many factors which may keep the defendant from giving
notice. There are possibilities of late discovery of witnesses to support
the alibi or of the inability of the accused to recall his whereabouts."2
These may come within the sweep of exceptions which will move the
courts to allow introduction of supporting evidence. But apart from
considerations of what is or is not good cause for not giving notice, an
adequate solution to the alibi problem seems to lie elsewhere. The most
satisfactory law would seem to be that which requires minimum informa-
tion in the advance notice, making it easier for the defendant to comply;
and which provides either for exclusion only in those cases where the de-
fendant is in bad faith or which eliminates the exclusion provision al-
together. The prosecutor should be allowed a continuance to investigate
the defense in the absence of notice. This would minimize the chance of
unfair result and still allow for effective prosecution in alibi cases.
NONAPPLICABILITY OF "SECURITY FOR EXPENSES" LEGISLA-
TION TO MINORITY STOCKHOLDERS' DIVIDEND SUITS
The usual state general corporation statute confers few rights upon
stockholders,' while at the same time entrusting the directors with great
powers in the management of the corporation 2 and the declaration of its
shall be entitled to a continuance of said case for not to exceed four days." IowA CODE
ANN. §777.18 (1946).
62. The two way exclusion of evidence provided for in the Indiana law merely ag-
gravates the problems arising under alibi legislation; the alibi law has the potentiality of
becoming a liability to the prosecutor rather than an asset.
1. The Indiana general corporation law is illustrative. The act provides that the
rights and powers of stockholders shall be those provided in the articles of incorporation
or expressed by the board of directors prior to the issuance of the shares involved. IND.
ANN. STAT. §25-205 (Burns Supp. 1953). There are no preemptive rights unless stated
in the articles of incorporation or in a resolution of the board of directors. Ibid. Voting
rights are given unless the articles of incorporation provide otherwise. Id. §25-207. The
right to adopt the by-laws must be expressed in the articles of incorporation. IND. ANN.
STAT. § 25-220 (Burns 1933). Any amendment of the articles of incorporation must be
adopted by those stockholders entitled to vote. Id. § 25-222. Merger and consolidation
must similarly be approved. IND. ANN. STAT. §§25-231, 25-232 (Burns Supp. 1953). A
stockholder who dissents to a merger or consolidation may demand payment for his
shares. Id. §25-236. The sale, lease, exchange, mortgaging or pledging of all or sub-
stantially all of the corporate assets must have the approval of the stockholders. Id. §25-
238. A dissenting stockholder from such sale may receive payment for his shares. Id.
§25-240. Stockholders must also approve a voluntary dissolution of the corporation. Id.
§25-241.
For an enumeration of the general powers and rights of stockholders see 13
FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §5717 (Wolf 1943).
2. See e.g., IND. ANN. STAT. §25-208 (Burns Supp. 1953); N.Y. GEN. CORP. LAW
§27 (Supp. 1953) ; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §141 (1953).
NOTES
dividends.3 Courts have generally shown reluctance to intercede in the
exercise of directors' duties on the theory that such interference would
reduce the responsibility resided in directors by state law.' The resulting
lack of authority on the part of the stockholder in the affairs of the cor-
poration amounts to an almost complete lack of control over the property
which he has furnished the corporation.5
3. See e.g., IND. ANN. STAT. §25-211 (Burns 1933); N.Y. STOCK CORP. LAW §58
(1951); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §170 (1953).
4. "The law will not interfere with the internal affairs of a corporation so long as
it is managed by its directors pursuant to a free, honest exercise of judgment uninfluenced
by personal, or by any considerations other than the welfare of the corporation." Bayer
v. Beran, 49 N.Y.S.2d 2, 6 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
One court indicated that directors will be held liable if they fail to exercise "... the
same degree of care and prudence that men prompted by self-interest generally exercise
in their own affairs. . . ." Hun v. Cary, 82 N.Y. 65, 71, 37 Am. Rep. 546, 548 (1880).
Again equitable relief will be granted when the directors have acted in bad faith, are
guilty of fraud or breach of trust. Kavanaugh v. Kavanaugh Knitting Co., 226 N.Y.
185, 196, 123 N.E. 148, 152 (1919). Another view is that the care required is that of any
reasonably prudent officer under similar circumstances. Atherton v. Anderson, 99 F.2d
883 (6th Cir. 1938). A provision in the articles of incorporation may relieve the directors
from certain liability. Everett v. Phillips, 288 N.Y. 227, 43 N.E.2d 18 (1942).
For discussions of the role of directors in corporate affairs see SPELLMAN, CORPORATE
DIRECrORS §6 (1931) ; PoMERoY's EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE §§1089-1091 (5th ed., Symons,
1941); 6 THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS §4520 (3d ed. 1927); Carson, Current Phases of
Derivative Action=s Against Directors, 40 MICH. L. REv. 1125, 1128-1131 (1942) ; Carson,
Further Phases of Derivative Actions Against Directors, 29 CORNELL L.Q. 431 (1944) ;
Uhlman, The Duty of Corporate Directors to Exercise Business Juldgment, 20 B.U.L.
REV. 488 (1940).
Reluctance of courts to interfere with corporate affairs is discussed in Comment, 48
MICH. L. REv. 87, 88 (1949) ; Note, 64 HARV. L. REV. 299 (1950).
For a consideration of the hesitancy of courts to interfere with discretion of direc-
tors in the declaration of dividends see BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS §231 (1946); 11
FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §5325 (Perm. ed. 1932); STEVENS, PRIVATE
CORPORATIONS §99 (2d ed. 1949).
5. See BERLE AND MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY C. 1(1948).
Certain writers have drawn a comparison between the corporation and the communist
form of government: "It is an odd paradox that a corporate board of directors and a
communist committee of commissars should so nearly meet in common contention. The
communist thinks of the community in terms of a state; the corporation director thinks of
it in terms of an enterprise; and though this difference between the two may well lead
to a radical divergence in results, it still remains true that the corporation director who
would subordinate the interests of the individual stockholder to those of the group more
nearly resembles the communist in mode of thought than he does the protagonist of pri-
vate property." Id. at 278.
One writer sees in the corporation the characteristics of a dictatorship: "It [a cor-
poration] is bureaucracy in its most rampant form. It may be characterized as dictator-
ship for the reason that the essential factor which distinguishes a democracy from a
dictatorship is not present; namely, consent of those governed to the personnel and policies
of those governing and a regular technique for discovering and making effective that
consent." Pinney, The Nature of the Corporation, 14 TEMPLE U.L.Q. 443, 472 (1940).
These comparisons, while perhaps overdrawn, do indicate the lack of stockholder
control over the corporation. A person who realizes that a stockholder has little voice
in the management of a corporation may hesitate to purchase stock since, his purchase
money may constitute a gift more than an investment. But at the same time the separa-
tion of ownership and control makes for a growth of industry not possible if the invest-
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The position of a minority stockholder may be further weakened by
the application of the so-called "Security for Expenses" legislation' to
dividend suits.' These statutes require the posting of a bond only when
suit is brought in the right of the corporation by the owners of less than
the specified percentage of the corporation's stock.' The acts are designed
primarily to curb "strike" suits which are those brought to harass directors
often with the motive of obtaining improper settlement.9 The presump-
ing public had to assume the burden of management. BERLE AND MEANS, 10C. cit. supra
at 5.
6. Several states have enacted this type of legislation. See CAL. CoaP. CODE ANN.
§834 (1949) ; MD. ANN. CODE GEN. LAWS art. 16, §206 (1951) ; N.J. STAT. ANN. §14:3-15
(Supp. 1949); N.Y. GEN. CoRP. LAW §61-b (Supp. 1953); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §1322
(Supp. 1949); Wis. STAT. §180.13(3) (1945).
The New Jersey law typically provides that: "In any action instituted or maintained
in the right of any domestic or foreign corporation by the holder or holders of shares, or
of voting trust certificates representing shares, of such corporation having a total par
value or stated capital value of less than five per centum (5%) of the aggregate par
value or stated capital value of all the outstanding shares of such corporation's stock of
every class . . . unless the shares or voting trust certificates held by such holder or
holders have a market value in excess of fifty thousand dollars ($50,000.00), the cor-
poration in whose right such action is brought shall be entitled, at any stage of the pro-
ceeding before final judgment, to require the complainant or complainants to give security
for the reasonable expenses, including counsel fees, which may be incurred by it in con-
nection with such action. . . . The amount of such security may thereafter, from time
to time, be increased or decreased in the discretion of the court having jurisdiction of
such action upon showing that the security provided has or may become inadequate or is
excessive. . . ." This New Jersey law was held constitutional in Cohen v. Beneficial
Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
The New York statute was upheld in Lapchak v. Baker, 208 N.Y. 89, 80 N.E.2d 751
(1948). For a discussion of the New York provision see Note, 23 ST. JOHN'S L. REv.
296 (1949).
7. The term "dividend suit," as used in this note refers to an action to compel the
declaration of dividends. The New York Court of Appeals recently affirmed the appli-
cation of its security for expenses law to minority stockholder's dividend suits. Gordon
v. Elliman, 119 N.E.2d 331 (N.Y. 1954).
8. Lennan v. Blakely, 80 N.Y.S.2d 288 (Sup. Ct. 1948). For a discussion of security
for expense laws see Note, Security For Expenses Legislation--Suininary, Analysis, and
Critique, 52 COL. L. REv. 267 (1952) ; Comment, Recent Developments in the California
Law of Shareholders' Derivative Suits, 1 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 79 (1953).
The New York and Maryland statutes are compared in Note, 8 MD. L. REV. 241
(1944). This type of legislation has been held applicable in derivative suits brought in
the federal courts. Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949). See
for a treatment of this aspect Notes, 1 RUTGERS L. REv. 117 (1947) ; 23 ST. JoHNs L.
REv. 296 (1949).
9. In giving executive approval to the New York statute Governor Dewey stated,
"In recent years a veritable racket of baseless lawsuits accompanied by many unethical
practices has grown up in this field. Worse yet, many suits that were well based have
been brought not in the interest of the corporation or of its stockholders, but in order to
obtain money for particular individuals who had no interest in the corporation or in its
stockholders. Secret settlements-really payoffs for silence-have been the subjects of
common suspicion." PUBLIC PAPERS OF THIOMAS E. DEWEY 255 (1944).
The New York Court of Appeals recognized this strike suit problem in Lapchak v.
Baker, 298 N.Y. 89, 95, 80 N.E.2d 751, 753 (1948). See also Ballantine, Abuses of Share-
holders' Derivative Suits: How Far is California's New "Security for Expenses" Act
Sound Regulatiwo?, 37 CALIF. L. REv. 399 (1949) ; Bowes, Should New York's "Security
NOTES
tion embodied in these laws is that if the interest of a stockholder is less
than the minimum amount he is acting in bad faith in bringing the suit.Y
The requirement of security was intended to discourage the bad faith suit.
The advocates of the proposal that the minority stockholder should
be required to post security in a dividend action contend that such a pro-
ceeding is within the policy of "Security for Expenses" legislation since
it may possibly be utilized as a strike suit." It is further maintained that
a dividend action amounts to a derivative suit because it is actually brought
against the directors of the corporation to enforce a corporate right. 2
Other authorities assert that the characteristics of a dividend action make
it unsuitable for strike suit purposes, and, moreover, that it is a proceeding
by the plaintiff in his own right, and that of his class, against the corpora-
for Expenses" Act be Amended?, 2 SYRAcusE L. REv. 37 (1950) ; De Capriles and Prunty,
Corporations, 29 N.Y.U.L. REv. 556, 557 (1954) ; Notes, 53 CoL. L. ZEv. 437, 439 (1953);
19 BRoo Ky L. ZEv. 312 (1953).
10. Governor Dewey pointed out that the New York law was not intended to
. bar any action . . . [or] . . . bar any right. It simply requires that the plaintiff
represent a certain minimum of interest in the corporation or that he put up security for
costs and expenses which will be incurred if his case is determined to be unfounded . . .
Even if the stockholder owns only a tiny percentage or only $5.00 worth of stock, it still
should be simple to bring an action without putting up security. If his action has any
merit at all, it should be easy enough to interest others who hold at least 5%, or stock
valued at $50,000.00." Puatic PAPERS or THOMAS E. DEWEY 255-256 (1944).
The problem as it exists in another jurisdiction is discussed in Ballantine, supra note
9, at 403.
For an analysis favorable to the acts see Carson, Further Phases of Derivative Ac-
tions Against Directors, 29 CORNELL L.Q. 431 (1944). For a criticism of the laws see
Bowes, supra note 9, at 37; Hornstein, The Death Knell of Stockholders' Derivative Suits
in New York, 32 CALIF. L. REv. 123 (1944) ; Zlinkoff, The American Investor and tie
Constitutionality of Section 61-b of the New York General Corporation Law, 54 YALE
L.J. 352 (1945) ; Note, 24 N.Y.U.L.Q. REv. 395 (1949).
The effect of the statutes on derivative suits is discussed in Hornstein, New Aspects
of Stockholders' Derivative Suits, 47 CoL. L. Rtv. 1 (1947).
The New York courts will permit the plaintiff to solicit other stockholders to join.
Neuworth v. Wyman, 119 N.Y.S.2d 266 (Sup. Ct. 1953). In this connection see De
Capriles and Prunty, Corporations, 29 N.Y.U.L. REv. 556, 557 (1954) ; Note, 52 COL. L.
REv. 267, 279 (1952).
11. See Gordon v. Elliman, 119 N.E.2d 331 (N.Y. 1954) in which a minority stodk-
holder, holding less than 5%, and less than $50,000 worth, of corporate stock, brought a
dividend action against a corporation and its directors. The corporation's motion to re-
quire plaintiff to post security because of Section 61-b of the New York General Cor-
poration Law was granted by the trial court. The order was affirmed by the New York
Court of Appeals by a four to three decision.
12. Courts in at least two jurisdictions have held that a dividend action is a deriva-
tive suit. Lydia E. Pinkham Medicine Co. v. Gove, 303 Mass. 1, 20 N.E.2d 482 (1939);
Jones v. Van Heusen Charles Co., 230 App. Div. 694, 246 N.Y. Supp. 204 (1930).
Dividend suits are described as derivative in 11 FLETCaER, op. cit. supra note 4, §5326.
One writer points out that the decisions in the cases above antedated the "Security for
Expenses" statutes and that the failure to distinguish had no effect on the rights of
parties. Note, 38 CoRNEL L.Q. 244, 251 (1953).
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tion rather than one brought in the right of the corporation."3 An analysis
of the various types of actions available to a minoi-Ity stockholder to pro-
tect his interests should be helpful in determining which assertions are
correct.
The minority stockholder can, on the one hand, bring an action
against either the directors or the corporation, depending upon who is at
fault, for a violation of his personal rights as an owner of corporation
stock.14 This may be a suit at law for damages or in equity for the
proper equitable relief. For example he can sue the directors for wrong-
ful refusal to transfer stock, for violation of his voting privileges, or for
refusal to allow inspection of the corporate books.15 If he pursues the
enforcement of rights of other stockholders as well as his own, his action
will be considered a class suit," and members of the class may intervene. 7
In addition to personal and class suits, the minority stockholder can
bring a derivative action if he meets the necessary requirements.'" This
suit must be brought in equity against the directors for breach of duty
13. See Gordon v. Elliman, 119 N.E.2d 331 (N.Y. 1954) (dissenting opinion) ; Swin-
ton v. W. J. Bush & Co., 102 N.Y.S.2d 994 (1951). See also Notes, 41 CALIF. L. REV. 546,
548-549 (1953) ; 53 COL. L. REV. 437, 438-439 (1953) ; 38 CORNELL L.Q. 244, 250 (1953);
22 FORD. L. Rxv. 97, 100 (1953) ; 4 SYRACUSE L. REV. 165 (1952).
14. BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS § 143 (1946); 13 FLETCHER, op. cit. supra note 1,
§5915; STEVENS, op. cit. supra note 4, §167.
15. 13 FLETCHER, op. cit. supra note 1, §5919.
16. The class suit originated in equity to eliminate multiple litigation and to simplify
the procedure in those cases in which members of a class are too numerous to be named
as parties. STEVENS, op. cit. supra note 4, §167. The term "class suit," as used in this
note, includes only those actions by a plaintiff in his own right as a member of his class
of stock. It does not include derivative suits, which are also considered class actions.
For a discussion of class suits see Note, Recurrent Problems in Action Brought on
Behalf of a Class, 34 COL. L. REV. 118 (1934).
17. "A stockholder may intervene as an individual, under the codes, where he has
an interest to be protected in the suit, but a cross-complaint in intervention by one stock-
holder, in a suit begun by another, must be germane to it." 13 FLETCHER, Op. Cit. supra
note 1, at 293. See also Note, 34 COL. L. REV. 118, 124 (1934).
The plaintiff remains in control of the suit, but if he does not prosecute with due care
those who intervene can assume the control. Note, Right to Control of Class Suits, 5
Wyo. L.J. 126, 129 (1951).
18. The derivative suit originated in England. Hitchens v. Congreve, 4 Russ. 562,
38 Eng. Rep. 917 (1828) ; Foss v. Harbottle, 2 Hare 461, 67 Eng. Rep. 189 (1843). Lead-
ing cases indicating the development in the United States are Robinson v. Smith, 3 Paige
Ch. 222 (N.Y. 1832) ; Dodge v. Woolsey, 18 How. 331 (U.S. 1855) ; Hawes v. Oakland,
14 Otto 450 (U.S. 1881). For a discussion of the development see Koessler, The Stock-
holder's Suit: A Comparative View, 46 COL. L. REV. 238, 239 (1946).
The derivative suit gained prominence after the congressional investigations in the
1930's. Hornstein, Rights of Stockholders in the New York Courts, 56 YALE L.J. 942
(1947). For a general discussion of the derivative suit see BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS
c. XI (1946) ; 13 FLETCHER, op. cit. supra note 1, c. 58 pt. XXXIII; STEVENS, op. cit.
supra note 4, §§167-174; Glenn, The Stockholder's Suit-Corporate and Individual Griev-
ances, 33 YALE LJ. 580 (1924).
NOTES
owed to the corporation.' 9 A stockholder must show that unless he is
permitted to bring such suit an injury to the corporation will remain un-
redressed." The corporate cause of action is, of course, the first pre-
requisite." This exists when some duty owed to the corporation, which
is expressly enumerated in the general corporation statute, the articles of
incorporation, or the corporation by-laws, or which is affixed by the com-
mon law, is violated by the directors to the consequent detriment of the
corporation.2 Exemplary of such wrongs committed by directors are
failure to sue a third party, improper use of corporate funds, and mis-
management. 2 It must also be shown that the plaintiff-stockholder has
been injured,24 but the harm to him, arising through the ownership of
stock, necessarily is indirect.25 It would seem correct to assert that the
injury to the corporation calling for relief in a derivative action must
consist in a reduction of the corporate assets. This appears to be the only
way in which the corporation could be directly and the stockholder in-
directly injured in the same transaction.2"
Contemporaneous ownership is often required. That is, the plain-
tiff must have been a stockholder at the time of the transaction or trans-
actions which caused the harm." This rule is instrumental in curbing
strike suits.28 A last requirement is that the plaintiff must show that he
19. "The right which the stockholder seeks as plaintiff to enforce is not his; hence
no common law court could hear him." Id. at 582.
See also Hornstein, Problems of Procedure in Stockholder's Derivative Suits, 42 COL.
L. REv. 574 (1942).
20. Robinson v. Smith, 3 Paige Ch. 222, 232 (N.Y. 1832) ; cf. Foss v. Harbottle,
2 Hare 461, 67 Eng. Rep. 189 (1843); Kavanaugh v. Commonwealth Trust Co., 181
N.Y. 121, 124, 73 N.E. 562, 563 (1905).
21. See Koster v. Am. Lumberman's Cas. Co., 330 U.S. 518, 522 (1946) ; Kavanaugh
v. Commonwealth Trust Co., 181 N.Y. 121, 124, 73 N.E. 562, 563 (1905). See also Glenn,
supra note 18, at 581; Koessler, supra note 18, at 242-243.
22. This breach of duty can be committed by directors, officers, promoters and
controlling stockholders. BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS §143 (1946). The term "directors"
as used in this note includes all those individuals.
23. BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS § 143 (1946).
24. Ibid. See also Koessler, supra note 18, at 243.
25. BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS §143 (1946); 13 FLETCHER, op. cit. supra note 1,
§5924.
26. Note, 40 CALIF. L. REv. 127, 129 (1952).
27. Hawes v. Oakland, 14 Otto 450 (U.S. 1881) ; Home Fire Ins. Co. v. Barber, 67
Neb. 644, 93 N.W. 1025 (1903). Some jurisdictions do not require contemporaneous
ownership. The federal rules impose the requirement. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b).
In those states where the rule of contemporaneous ownership prevails an exception
is made when the shares have devolved upon the plaintiff by operation of law. BALLAN-
TINE, CORPORATIONS §148 (1946). "Stockholder" has been interpreted to mean equitable
owner as well as record owner. Rosenthal v. Burry Biscuit Corp., 60 A.2d 106 (Del. Ch.
1948). For a criticism of the California statute adopting the "contemporaneous owner-
ship rule" see Comment, Recent Developments in the Califortia Law of Shareholders'
Derivative Suits, 1 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 79 (1953).
28. This is pointed out in 23 TEmp. L.Q. 82, 84 (1949). See also, 3 STANFORD L.
REv. 151, 154 (1950).
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has demanded appropriate action by the directors and by the stockholders
as a body, or else convince the court that such demands, if made, would
have been useless.2" Demand on the stockholders is not required by the
courts unless the stockholders as a body" could have ratified the particular
transaction."0
A derivative suit is brought in equity even though the corporate
cause of action may be one ordinarily maintainable at law.3" This is neces-
sary because the stockholder is not suing in his right. The plaintiff-
stockholder must bring the suit on behalf of himself, all other stock-
holders, and the corporation because the cause of action belongs primarily
to the corporation and indirectly to all the stockholders." The directors
having committed the harm are the real defendants.3 The corporation
is a nominal defendant for the purpose of preventing other suits based on
the same claim. 4 Other stockholders can intervene because they are in-
terested parties. 5 The plaintiff usually is allowed to retain control of the
suit," but he assumes the position of a fiduciary to the corporation and
the stockholders; any damages recovered must be turned over to the cor-
poration."7 The plaintiff gains financially only through a possible future
dividend. His counsel fees are, of course, paid by the corporation if the
suit is successful.3 " The corporation is directly benefited since its property
29. Toebelman v. Missouri-Kansas Pipe Line Co., 41 F.Supp. 334, 340 (D.C. Del.
1941). See also BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS §146 (1946). For a general discussion of
the demand prerequisite see Comment, 48 MICH. L. Rv. 87 (1949).
30. Id. at 91.
31. See note 19 supra.
32. The complaint is brought by plaintiff in his own behalf and all other stock-
holders similarly situated. 13 FLETCHER, op. cit. supra note 1, §6004. It must allege a
cause of action in favor of the corporation. Id. §6005.
33. Robinson v. Smith, 3 Paige Ch. 222, 231 (N.Y. 1832) ; see note 22 supra.
34. Myers v. Smith, 190 Minn. 157, 159, 251 N.W. 20, 21 (1933). The corporation
is a passive party; its funds cannot be used to aid the actual defendants who are the
directors. BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS §154 (1946). An exception to the rule requiring
the corporation to be a party defendant has been made where the corporation has been
dissolved. 13 FLETCHER, Op. cit. supra note 1, §5997. It has been asserted that the cor-
poration might logically be considered the plaintiff since it receives any recovery made.
Note, 66 HARV. L. REv. 342, 348 (1952).
35. They must obtain leave of the court. Glenn, supra note 18, at 583. See also
Hornstein, Problems of Procedure in Stockholder's Derivative Suits, 42 COL. L. Rav. 574,
575 (1942).
36. After others intervene they share in the control, 13 FLETCHER, op. cit. supra note
1, §6019, but the plaintiff continues to be domnims litus. BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS §153
(1946).
37. Young v. Higbee Co., 324 U.S. 204 (1945) ; Clark v. Greenberg, 296 N.Y. 146,
71 N.E.2d 443 (1947) ; 23 N.Y.U.L.Q. REV. 192 (1948). See Notes 49 W. VA. L.Q. 176
(1943) ; 40 CALIF. L. Rv. 127, 131 (1952). Direct relief may be allowed when there is
dissolution or when circuity of action will be avoided. 13 FLETCHER, op. cit. supra note 1,
§6028.
38. "The liberal allowance of counsel fees to the champion of the rights of a group
is the dynamic factor giving the necessary impetus and incentive to the volunteer method
of representation in class and derivative suits. Otherwise no one individual shareholder
NOTES
is protected, its existence prolonged, and its management brought in check.
Just as in actions clearly derivative, the courts manifest great hesi-
tancy in permitting interference with internal corporate affairs through
dividend suits brought by minority stockholders."9 The stockholder must
bring the action in equity"0 as is required in a derivative suit.' It is neces-
sary as a condition precedent to suit that the plaintiff, as a present stock-
holder of the company, make a demand upon the directors to declare
dividends.42
In the absence of statute, charter provision, or by-law making the
declaration of dividends mandatory,43 the stockholder's successful main-
tenance of a dividend suit depends upon refusal by the directors to make
a declaration; this refusal must amount to such an abuse of discretion as
to constitute a fraud or a breach of good faith on the part of the direc-
tors.44 Directors in declaring dividends have two considerations before
them. They must be certain that the corporation has the financial abil-
ity,4 and they must act in good faith toward the stockholders.46 The
could afford to begin a suit of such size and difficulty or undertake to resist an affair
settlement." BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS §156 (1946).
39. See note 4 supra. There are conflicting policies involved: The corporation must
be sound so that the public can deal with it safely, but yet there should be a reasonable
division of the corporation's surplus earnings among the stockholders. Hiscock v. Lacy,
9 Misc. 578, 591, 30 N.Y. Supp. 860, 869 (1894).
40. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459, 170 N.W. 668 (1919) ; Hiscock v.
Lacy, 9 Misc. 578, 592, 30 N. Y. Supp. 860, 869 (1894). It is said that profits belong to
the corporation and not to the stockholders individually, and thus there is no right enforce-
able at law for dividends. Gibbons v. Mahon, 136 U.S. 549, 558 (1890).
41. See note 19 supra.
42. If the stockholder can show that a demand would be futile, he need not make it.
BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS §234 (1946).
43. Crocker v. Waltham Watch Co., 315 Mass. 397, 53 N.E.2d 230 (1940) (involv-
ing charter provision); Lydia E. Pinkham Medicine Co., 303 Mass. 1, 20 N.E.2d 482
(1939) (involving by-law). As to statutory provisions making the declaration and pay-
ment of dividends mandatory see BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS §233 (1946) ; 11 FLETCHER,
op. cit. supra note 4, §5325.
For an analysis of the stockholders' problems in compelling declaration of dividends
see Stirm, Ability of Stockholders to Compel Directors of a Corporation to Declare Divi-
dends, 5 INTRA. (N.Y.U.) L. REv. 35 (1949). See also Notes, 64 HARv. L. REV. 299
(1950) ; 39 ILL. L. REV. 90 (1944).
Apparently mandatory provisions may be interpreted as not mandatory. See Rubens
v. MarionWashington Realty Corp., 116 Ind. App. 55, 59 N.E.2d 907 (1945), 44 MICH. L.
REV. 318.
44. See Hunter v. Roberts, Throp & Co., 83 Mich. 63, 71, 47 N.W. 131, 134 (1890);
Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459, 170 N.W. 668,,682 (1919); Hiscock v. Lacy,
9 Misc. 578, 592, 30 N.Y. Supp. 860, 873 (1894) ; W.Q. 'O'Neall Co. v. O'Neall, 108 Ind.
App. 116, 125, 25 N.E.2d 656, 660 (1940) ; City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v, Hewitt Realty
Co., 257 N.Y. 62, 67, 177 N.E. 309, 311 (1931) ; 15 IND. L.J. 575 (1940).
See also SPELLMAN, CORPORATE DIRECTORS §141 (1931) ; STEVENS, op. cit. supra note
4, §99; Massey, Rights of Miority'Stockholders, 32 Mica. S.B.J. 12 (1953).
45. Corporate assets are considered a trust fund for creditors of the corporation, and
they cannot be distributed to :the stockholders if the creditors would be prejudiced. 11'
FLETCHER, op. cit. supra note 4, §5329. Y
46. See" the cases cited in note 44 supra.
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stockholders have purchased stock in reliance that they will receive divi-
dends." The corporation, as a separate legal entity,"s with, as some con-
tend, an intent and conscience of its own,4" cannot reasonably expect
people to make investments without expectation of profit.
Since the stockholders may reasonably expect a return on their invest-
ments, some authorities maintain that a contract for payment of dividends
exists between individual stockholders and the corporation. The divi-
dend action, it is further asserted, is merely a suit in equity to obtain
specific performance." It is thus not an action in the right of the cor-
poration but one personal to the stockholder. Since there is no express
agreement as to when dividends will be declared, 1 the contract, if it exists,
is one implied in law or fact. In a successful dividend action the equity
court awards dividends on the finding that it would be an abuse of discre-
tion by the directors and unfair to the plaintiff and his class if they failed
to receive dividends. Inasmuch as this is consistent with the theory of a
contract implied in law 2 a dividend suit could logically be termed a con-
tract action.
The New York Court of Appeals rejected this argument in Gordon
v. Ellimn.55 It is true that the courts have not in express terms referred
to dividend proceedings as contract actions, but there has actually been no
need for such characterization since a court of equity will allow the proper
relief without regard to the theory of recovery. 4
47. For an examination of the stockholder's position see Hammond, The Stock-
holder's Stake in Corporate Profits, 88 TRUSTS & ESTATES 566 (1949). A business cor-
poration, after all, is organized and operated for the profit of the stockholders as is
pointed out in Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459, 170 N.W. 668, 684 (1919).
48. See Israel, The Legal Fiction of Corporate Entity and Modern Law, 3 GA. B.J.
46 (1940).
49. See Pinney, supra note 5, for a good analysis of the corporate being.
50. BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS §231 (1946).
51. This situation exists in the absence of charter provision, by-law, or statute mak-
ing declaration of dividends mandatory. See note 43 supra.
52. "Contracts implied in law, or more properly quasi or constructive contracts, are
a class of obligations which are imposed or created by law without regard to the assent
of the party bound, on the ground that they are dictated by reason and justice, and
which are allowed to be enforced by an action ex contractu. They rest solely on a legal
fiction, and are not contract obligations at all in the true sense, for there is no agree-
ment; but they are clothed with the semblance of contract for the purpose of the remedy,
and the obligation arises not from consent, as in the case of true contracts, but from the
law or natural equity . . ." 13 C.J. 244 (1917).
53. 119 N.E.2d 331 (N.Y. 1954).
54. See, e.g., Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459, 170 N.W. 668 (1919); His-
cock v. Lacy, 9 Misc. 578, 30 N.Y. Supp. 860 (1894). In the Dodge case the directors of
the Ford Motor Company were ordered to declare a dividend of $19,275,385.96. The sur-
plus available for dividends was $111,960,907.53. The practice had been to declare divi-
dends, but in ,1916 the directors decided to expand the plant and production so that a
cheaper automobile could be sold. This would have benefited the public at the expense of
the stockholders. Because the company could have well afforded to pay greater dividends
NOTES
Whether the contract theory is accepted or rejected there are other
more substantial considerations which advance the argument that a divi-
dend suit is not derivative. The contention that the dividend suit is in
the right of the corporation is based on the concept that the good faith
declaration of dividends is a duty owed to the corporation; this duty is
seen as enforced when the plaintiff stockholder brings a dividend suit. A
factor militating against such contention is that although it is possible for
the corporation to be injured by a failure to declare dividends,55 the harm
it receives is indirect and remote as compared with that to the stockholder.
The interested stockholders would have failed to receive the very thing for
which they invested their money. Further, any loss of corporate assets
due to failure to declare dividends would probably be recoverable in a
derivative suit based on charges of mismanagement." Since the corpora-
tion suffers only indirect and remote injury, the primary cause of action
appropriately attaches to the plaintiff stockholder and his class.
This conclusion is further substantiated when it is considered that
the proceeds of the suit i.e., the dividends ordered declared, go directly to
the stockholders,"r "while in a derivative suit the benefit goes to the cor-
poration. In addition, in a dividend suit only the class directly affected
by the failure to declare dividends participates in the recovery, while in a
derivative suit all the stockholders are advantaged through the benefit
conferred on the corporation.
Another distinguishing factor is that the dividend ordered declared
by a decree favorable to the plaintiff is paid by the corporation. This
liability of the corporation indicates that it is the real party defendant
in a dividend suit. In a derivative action a corporation is only a nominal
defendant, the directors being the ones against whom the suit is directed.
It should also be noted that, although the directors constitute the
than the $1,200,000 declared, the refusal to declare more was held an arbitrary refusal, not
in the interest of the stockholders since a business corporation is organized primarily for
the profit of the stockholders.
55. For example, the failure to pay dividends could result in the imposition of a
penalty under the Internal Revenue Code for improperly accumulating surplus. INT. REV.
CODE §§531-533 (1954). A corporation has an interest or concern regarding its dividend
policy as it affects the market price of its securities, but any injury received by the cor-
poration would be a consequence from injury to the individual stockholders. The stock-
holders would be the ones primarily hurt on the market by the failure to declare divi-
dends, except when a new issue of stock is being sold. In that instance, injury received
by the corporation could probably be redressed by a derivative suit.
56. If there were liability under the Internal Revenue Code corporate assets would
be diminished, and a derivative suit could probably be maintained against the directors.
See Gordon v. Elliman, 119 N.E.2d 331, 342 (1954) (dissenting opinion).
57. The court orders a specific amount to be distributed to the stockholders. Dodge
v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459, - , 170 N.W. 668, 685 (1919) ; Kroese v. General
Steel Castings Corp., 179 F.2d 760, 763 (3d Cir. 1946) cert. denied 339 U.S. 983 (195Q).
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
management of the corporation and have the power as conferred by the
general corporation statute to declare dividends, 8 there is a split of
authority as to whether they are indispensable parties to a dividend
action.5" The better view is that they are not because it is the corporation
which is primarily affected by a decree. A disposition of corporate prop-
erty is involved, and the decree can be enforced by sequestration or other
equitable means without the presence of the directors.6" Declaring divi-
dends under court decree is a purely ministerial act.6
For these reasons it must be concluded that an action to compel the
declaration of dividends is not a derivative suit; it is rather a suit to en-
force a right personal to the stockholder or to his class. It would follow
that the plaintiff in such an action should not be required to post security
for expenses of the corporation.
A most important consideration is that of the policy behind the "Se-
curity for Expenses" legislation. These laws have been enacted for the
purpose of preventing strike suits.62 A derivative suit is peculiarly sus-
ceptible to use as a strike suit. A minority stockholder could bring an
action in bad faith upon some technical error made by directors with the
intent of securing a money settlement. The defendant directors will of-
ten seek to settle out of court because a long and difficult suit would thus
be avoided.s On the other hand, a dividend suit is not particularly adapt-
able for use as a strike suit. The burden of proof on the stockholder to-
gether with the expense of litigation are almost prohibitive of such suits;
improper settlements are very unlikely. Directors would not be so in-
clined to settle since they could not be directly affected by an adverse
decision. In a successful dividend suit the liability lodges entirely in the
corporation while in a derivative action the directors may be personally
involved.
The policy behind "Security for Expenses" legislation does not ex-
tend to dividend actions. These suits are not adapted for use as strike
suits and an analysis of the nature of a dividend action indicates a striking
58. See notes 2 and 3 supra.
59. Schuckman v. Rubenstein, 164 F.2d 952 (6th Cir. 1947) (held indispensable);
Kroese v. General Steel Castings Corp., 179 F.2d 760 (3d Cir. 1946) cert. denied 339 U.S.
983 (1950) (held not indispensable).
See Notes 26 IND. L.J. 79 (1950) ; 98 U. OF PA. L. REv. 753 (1950) ; 50 MIcH. L. REv.
1102 (1952).
60. Note, 26 IND. L.J. 79, 82 (1950).
61. Kroese v. General Steel Castings Corp., 179 F.2d 760, 764 (3d Cir. 1946) cert.
denied 339 U.S. 983 (1950). Of course, as one writer points out the enforcement of the
decree would be more convenient if a majority were before the court. Note, 98 U. OF PA.
L. REv. 753, 755 (1950).
62. See note 9 supra.
63. For a discussion of the considerations which may lead to settlements see Note,
54 HARV. L. Rav. 833 (1941).
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dissimilarity to derivative proceedings. This legislation, representing as
it does, an innovation in the regulation of minority stockholders' deriva-
tive suits should be narrowly confined to those actions clearly in the right
of the corporation.
